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Abstract 
We investigate changes in monthly income volatility in non-elderly households in the U.S. since the early 1990s. Using 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we find that monthly income volatility is highest for lower 
income households, and that it increased substantially for these households between 1992 and 2003. The increase 
appears to have its roots in the shift of household income away from relatively stable public assistance (AFDC/TANF) 
benefits and towards earnings. We subject these findings to sensitivity analyses and find similar results. We also find 
increases in volatility among households with incomes above the poverty line, but these findings are less robust in the 
face of some sensitivity analyses.
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we investigate changes in monthly income volatility for households in the U.S. with 
a particular focus on low-income households.  Drawing on data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) to examine variation in monthly household income, we employ 
data from both 1991-92 and 2002-03 in order to relate our results to different policy 
environments.  Previous authors have considered fluctuations in household income by focusing 
on discrete events such as job loss or divorce.  While these studies examine important issues, 
they ignore income volatility that results from other kinds of labor market or life events.  Thus, 
our work is complementary.  We measure volatility as the coefficient of variation (CV) of 
monthly income over a 12-month period, taking into consideration income from all sources. 
 
We find that monthly income volatility is highest for lower income households, and that 
volatility for these households increased substantially between 1992 and 2003.  The increases in 
volatility were largest for households in deep poverty – those with incomes below 50 percent of 
the poverty threshold and for a population ‘at risk’ for welfare recipiency – households headed 
by a single adult without a high school degree.  We also find increases in volatility among 
households with incomes above the poverty threshold, but these findings are less robust in the 
face of some sensitivity analyses.  We decompose household income volatility and find that the 
increase in income volatility among poor households has its roots in the shift of household 
income away from relatively stable public assistance benefits (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children or AFDC, and then Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or TANF) and towards 
earnings. 
 
Ideally households would smooth consumption by saving during time periods when they 
experience positive income shocks and by dissaving or borrow during time periods of negative 
income shocks.  However, if households lack perfect information about the future course of their 
income, have little left over to save in good times or are liquidity constrained and unable to 
borrow in bad times, then weathering income fluctuations may not be straight-forward.  Jappelli 
(1990) examines data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and finds that roughly 20 percent 
of the population appears to be liquidity constrained; Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) 
reach similar conclusions.  Furthermore, because mean income levels and material well-being of 
welfare leavers and recipients have risen little since welfare reform (e.g. Corcoran et al., 2007, 
Blank, 2006, Bloom et al., 2002, Haskins, 2001) we might think that this population might lack 
the resources to successfully cope with income fluctuations.  Monthly income volatility at the 
household level can have important implications: A rise in volatility for households living near 
the poverty threshold is likely to increase the frequency with and extent to which they slip below 
that threshold.  Instability of this sort may affect the ability of households to maintain sufficient 
expenditure levels for fundamentals such as food, housing and medical care.  If volatility 
impedes the ability of lower income households to reliably meet monthly contractual obligations 
(Gundersen and Gruber, 2001), this may lead to events such as eviction, foreclosure or increased 
reliance on short-term debt.  The policy implications from volatility extend from the possible 
need to provide a social safety net against such shocks, to the mechanics of actually doing so. 
 
The broader context for considering the volatility of income over time was established by 
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994, 2007) with their examination of the annual earnings of men in the 2 
PSID first from the 1970s through the 1980s, and then from the 1970s through 2002.  They 
examine repeated cross-sections over long historical time periods and find evidence of rising 
transitory variance of annual earnings in the U.S. over this time period.   Dynan, Elmendorf and 
Sichel (2007) similarly find that annual household income among households in the PSID 
became increasingly volatile over the same time period, and Hertz (2006) reports comparable 
findings for 1991/92, 1997/98 and 2003/04 using matched CPS samples.  In addition, several 
researchers (Hacker and Jacobs, 2008; Bollinger and Ziliak, 2009) have found an increase in 
annual income volatility in the U.S. during the 1990s and early 2000s that is particularly sharp 
among lower income households.  To our knowledge, however, there are no studies of monthly 
household income volatility.   
 
In the sections that follow, we provide an overview of our data and methods, and follow with a 
discussion of monthly income volatility for non-elderly U.S. households for twelve-month 
periods in 1991-92 and 2002-03.  Comparisons across the two time periods are made in 
aggregate and for numerous sub-groups.  We also decompose the measure of monthly income 
volatility in each time period into the portions attributable to fluctuations in earned income, in 
cash and in other income sources.  Finally, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to 
eliminate a number of measurement error issues as possible explanations for rising income 
volatility.  We conclude with some comments about the implications of our findings. 
 
2.  Data and Methods 
 
We use data from the 1991, 1992 and 2001 panels of the SIPP.  We selected panels that bracket 
major changes in U.S. welfare policy in the late 1990s.  To insure comparability and to eliminate 
possible seasonal factors we use comparable calendar months from both periods.  The result is a 
12-month data set for each household in each panel.  These cover the calendar months October 
1991 through December 1992 in the first panels and October 2002 through December 2003 in 
the second.
1  Both time periods represent relatively comparable points in the business cycle.
2  
We limit our sample to non-elderly (age 18 to 59) household heads.  After restrictions related to 
sample definition, we have a sample of 22,776 household heads in the 1991/92 panel and 18,497 
household heads from the 2001 panel. 
   
Household income on the SIPP is defined as all sources of money income before taxes; all 
income measures are deflated to 1992 dollars using the consumer price index for all urban 
consumers (CPI-U).  The survey is quite comprehensive and includes earned income (wage and 
salary income from employment), cash transfer payments (e.g. AFDC/TANF, SSI, social 
security, unemployment benefits, veterans payments), lump-sum and one-time payments 
(inheritances, insurance settlements, retirement distributions etc.), regular salary or other income 
from a self-owned business, property income, and interest received on most types of assets.  
                                                 
1 The 12 months of interviews are spread over a total of 15 months because each SIPP panel is divided into four 
rotation groups and one-quarter of the interviews are conducted in each calendar month.   
2 The National Bureau for Economic Research dated March 1991 and November 2001 as business cycle troughs.  
Thus, the surveys used here commenced 7 months following the trough in the first panel and 13 months following 
the trough in the second panel.  No other business cycle troughs occurred between 1991 and 2001. 3 
Interest accrued on Individual Retirement Accounts, 401(k)s, savings bonds and similar 
instruments are excluded from the calculation of household income.
3 
 
Pre-tax income as defined here does not include benefits received through the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC).  Since the SIPP reports EITC benefits on a calendar (tax) year basis, we 
cannot identify the timing or frequency of any payments received and are unable to include EITC 
in calculations of monthly income volatility.  While EITC recipients have the option of taking an 
advance payment option to receive incremental payments as a ‘refund’ on their paychecks, Hotz 
and Scholz (2001) report that in 1998 only 1.1 percent of recipients took advantage of this 
option.  Instead, 92 percent of EITC payments are received between February and May of each 
year as a lump sum payment or tax credit (Barrow and McGranahan, 2000).  Thus, the inclusion 
of EITC would increase measured income volatility in both time periods.  Furthermore, because 
the EITC was significantly expanded between 1991 and 1996 (Forman, 2005) its inclusion would 
be likely to add to both the increase in volatility over time and to the difference in volatility we 
find between lower and higher income households.
4 
 
Most household characteristics are defined for the twelfth interview month in the time span 
discussed above.
   Longitudinal measures, such as annual household income and income 
volatility, are defined for the 12 months up to and including month 12.  We measure volatility as 
the CV of monthly income over those twelve months. The CV is ideally suited to capture the 
broad notion of volatility that we are interested in:  Discrete household event measures are 
unlikely to capture the full range of conditions that might subject household income to 
fluctuation; measures of shock alone do not capture recurring income fluctuations.  Unlike the 
variance, the CV is scale insensitive; the CV also reflects increases in variation in direct 
proportion.   
 
3.  Results 
 
In Table 1, we present the median CV of income over the 12-month period for all households in 
the sample, as well as for a variety of sub-groups.  Results are shown for the both the 1991/92 
panel and the 2001 panel.  Income volatility is higher for lower-income households, for single-
parent households, for those receiving either welfare or Food Stamp assistance, for renters, for 
smaller households and for those in which the household head did not complete high school.  In 
particular, households living below the poverty threshold in the 1991/92 panel had volatility that 
was 61 percent higher than those above the poverty threshold (29.5 vs. 18.3).
5  Single-parent 
households had 8 percent higher income volatility than dual-parent households (23.8 vs. 22.0). 
 
                                                 
3 Food Stamp and WIC benefits is not included in this definition of income.  As a check on the robustness of our 
findings, we repeat the analyses below including the cash value of Food Stamp and WIC benefits in income with no 
substantive change in our findings. 
4 More generally, while pre-tax income is more indicative of market outcomes, post-tax income is the preferred 
measure of well-being.  However, because income tax is an annual liability and can be paid either through monthly 
withholding or as an annual lump-sum, the effect of income taxation on monthly income volatility is difficult to 
establish.  
5 We employ the U.S. Census Bureau poverty thresholds for 1992 and 2003.  
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld.html, accessed August 22, 2009). 4 
Comparing volatility measures across the two panels we see that income volatility has risen over 
time.  While mean household monthly income levels changed little during this time period,
6  the 
median CV for the whole sample rose from 18.7 to 20.8 – an increase of 11 percent.  The 
increase in income volatility occurred among different family types, across all races, across poor 
and non-poor households, in households with and without Food Stamps or AFDC/TANF and so 
on.  However, this increase is greatest among lower-income households.  For households in 
poverty, volatility increased from 29.5 to 38.6 – an increase of 31 percent, while for non-poor 
households the increase was less substantial (11 percent).  The increase in volatility was greatest 
for the poorest households, those with income below 50 percent of the poverty threshold.  In this 
group, volatility increased 88 percent. 
 
Because policies regarding the receipt of cash and food assistance changed dramatically in the 
late 1990s, a direct comparison of AFDC/TANF or Food Stamp recipients across the two panels 
entails comparing households subject to distinctly different policy processes and selection 
mechanisms.  For instance, in this sample, the share of households receiving cash assistance 
dropped from 4.7 percent to 1.4 percent from the first to the second time period.  Based on the 
literature on the welfare population before and after reform, we suspect that the composition of 
households receiving cash assistance changed considerably between the two panels.  In order to 
generate a comparable group of individuals in both panels who are likely to have been affected 
by the changes in welfare policy, we instead examine households who might be ‘at-risk’ for 
welfare participation.  We define these to be families headed by single parents who have not 
graduated from high school and who are living with their children with no other adults present.  
The measured income volatility for this ‘welfare at-risk’ group jumps dramatically between the 
two time periods.  In the 1991/92 panel, there is a relatively small difference in income volatility 
levels between the households deemed ‘at risk’ for welfare and those who are not (22.6 versus 
18.7).  In the second time period, that gap has grown considerably.  The income volatility 
measure for the ‘at-risk’ households rises to 36.6, a 62 percent increase, while for other 
households it rose only 11 percent.   
 
To examine the sources of increased volatility, we decompose total household income into three 
components:  earnings, AFDC/TANF income, and all other income.  Panel A of Table 2 reports 
the CV for each of these components of income for the 1991/92 and 2001 SIPP panels.  Among 
all households in the sample, we find that earnings volatility rose little, while volatility of 
AFDC/TANF and all other income actually declined between the two time periods.  Thus, the 
increase in volatility for total household income must be explained by a compositional shift away 
from less volatile sources of income (AFDC/TANF) to more volatile sources (earnings and all 
other income).  The share of income coming from each component is reported in Panel B of 
Table 2.  Indeed, among all households, the share of total income derived from earnings rose 
from 84 percent to 87 percent, while the share derived from welfare income fell from 3 percent 
to 1 percent.  These changes are much more pronounced for lower-income and welfare at-risk 
households.  For welfare at-risk households, earnings as a share of total income rose from 37 to 
58 percent, while welfare payments dropped from 40 to 14 percent of income.  Other income as a 
                                                 
6 Across households of all income levels, mean household income for month 12 of the study period rose 11 percent 
over the 11 years between the two panels, from $3,408 to $3,792; among households below the poverty threshold 
mean monthly income changed little ($934 in 1991/92 and $935 in 2002/03). 5 
share of the total rose somewhat, from 23 to 28 percent.  Results for households in poverty are 
similar. 
 
The net effect of changes in both the volatility of income components and of the shares of 
income components can be more formally summarized with a variance decomposition proposed 
by Shorrocks (1982).  Shorrocks shows that the share of the CV squared (and similarly, the share 
of the variance) attributable to the kth element of income is equal to:   
 S
k = Cov (Y
k,  Y)/  Var  (Y),           (1) 
where Y is total income and Y
k is its kth element.   In the application here, we compute S
k for 
each household based on the variance of their total income over the 12 months included and the 
covariance between income components and total income over those 12 months.  Averages 
across households are reported in Panel C of Table 2. 
 
The Shorrock decomposition suggests that earnings are the largest contributor to income 
volatility.
7  Furthermore, across all households, the share of volatility attributable to earnings 
rose over this period (from 88 to 90 percent), with a corresponding drop in the share attributable 
to welfare payments and from other income.  An examination of the different household types 
and income levels again indicates that the largest changes occurred among households below the 
poverty threshold and those at-risk for welfare.  For example, among those at-risk for welfare, 
the share of volatility attributable to earnings rose from 55 to 68 percent, while the share from 
AFDC/TANF dropped from 76 to 7 percent.  Note that for welfare at-risk households in the first 
panel, ‘other income’ makes a negative contribution to volatility.  This indicates that ‘other 
income’ varies negatively with total income, thereby exerting a stabilizing influence on the total. 
 
3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The SIPP is known to have a considerable amount of imputed data, as well as to suffer from 
‘seam bias’.  If changes in procedure from one implementation of the SIPP to the next altered 
either of these data characteristics, then this could be a source of the differences we find across 
the two time periods.  We experiment with a number of robustness checks to see whether or not 
SIPP procedures could account for the increases in volatility that we find here.   
  
SIPP documentation identifies a number of differences in the imputation routines used before 
and after changes made to the survey implementation in 1996 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).  To 
address this issue, we repeat our calculations under three alternate scenarios.  In the first case, we 
eliminate all households for which any component of income was imputed for any month of the 
periods studied.  This involves eliminating a household from analysis if any of 20 separate 
components of income are imputed for any household member in any of the 12 months in the 
first time period, and if any of 70 income components are imputed in the second time period.
8  
This reduces the sample size by half for the 1991/92 panel and by two-thirds for the 2001 panel.  
In the second scenario, we use a somewhat less strict restriction – we only eliminate households 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with findings by Newman (2006). 
8 Both SIPP panels employ the same definition of total household income, however, more detailed income 
components are reported in the later panel. 6 
for whom a component of earnings was imputed for any household member for any month.
9  In 
the third scenario, we eliminate all households for which a ‘Z-type’ imputation was performed 
for any household member for one or more months of data in our time periods.
10   
 
Our finding of a substantial increase in volatility among very poor households is robust to each 
of these three sensitivity checks.  On the other hand, our finding of a smaller increase in 
volatility for all households is less robust.  In the case of the first two restrictions on imputed 
data (no imputed income or no imputed earnings data), the increase in volatility over time across 
all households is diminished to little more than a 1 percent increase.  When only z-type 
imputations are eliminated, the increase in volatility for all households remains a relatively 
robust 11 percent. 
 
The SIPP is administered every fourth month with information collected retrospectively for the 
four preceding months (with four months being considered a ‘wave’).  While this affords a 
shorter period for recall bias than surveys that are conducted on an annual bias, this interview 
structure imbues SIPP data with a degree of ‘seam bias’ – items such as self-reported income are 
more consistent within interview waves than between them.  Thus, reported changes tend to be 
much larger between two months if those months cross waves than if they are within the same 
interview wave.  If one calculates the median absolute percentage change in income from one 
month to the next, this results in a characteristic ‘saw-tooth’ pattern – the magnitude of the 
percentage changes between adjoining months in different waves is significantly larger than 
between months within the same wave.  Furthermore, a comparison of the percent changes in 
month 1 of waves 2 and 3 with the percent changes in other months suggests that the relative 




Other authors have noted that seam bias is likely to alter the measured variance of any time 
series that span two or more interview waves (e.g. Newman, 2006).  However, it is unclear a 
priori whether seam bias is likely to increase or decrease the measured variance (or CV) in such 
a case.  The total variance can be computed as the sum of the between- and the within-wave 
variance.  By definition, seam bias decreases within-wave variance (because reported values 
within one wave are more alike than they would be in the absence of bias); the total effect will 
only be positive if seam bias increases between-wave variance by a larger amount.  It is easy to 
construct examples in which the sum of these two effects is either positive or negative. 
 
                                                 
9 For each household in each month, four potential sources of either wage and salary or self-employment earnings 
are reported for each household member over the age of 16. 
10 A SIPP ‘Z-type’ imputation is the case were an entire missing interview record for a respondent is replaced with 
actual data from another respondent who is matched on a variety of demographic characteristics. 
11 Some changes in survey methodology were introduced in 1996, in between the two SIPP panels used here.  These 
changes included the introduction of Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) and were in part intended to 
reduce the degree in seam bias (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).  Doyle, Martin and Moore (undated), however, note that 
it does not appear that the hoped for reduction in seam bias occurred after 1996. 
12 It is interesting to note that seam bias is, in a sense, a function of volatility in the underlying series.  To the extent 
that the true values of a data series do not change over time, this kind of reporting bias will not occur.  Thus, if 
monthly income volatility increases over time, this could itself be a source of an increase in seam bias between the 
two panels. 7 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that seam bias could potentially have a systematic impact on 
income volatility if the degree of seam bias is either more or less for lower-income or higher-
income households or has changed over time (which it appears to have).  In an effort to gauge 
the importance of seam bias for our results we take two approaches.  In the first approach, we 
reestimate the CVs of monthly income for each household in our samples, limiting the 
calculation to the last month in each interview wave – the months in which income is most likely 
to be accurately reported.  This analysis yields results that are essentially the same as we reported 
in Table 1. 
   
In our second approach, we follow Newman (2006) in applying exponential smoothing to 
remove the effects of seam bias from monthly household income.  For each household in the 
sample, we compute an adjusted series: 
St = α Yt + (1-α) St - 1           (2) 
where Yt is the observed monthly household income in month t, St is the exponentially smoothed 
income and α is the smoothing parameter which lies between 0 and 1.
13  We then calculate the 
CV of the smoothed series for each household in the sample.  This measure, purged of the effects 
of seam bias, is a pure measure of volatility that is unrelated to the presence of seam bias.  The 
value of α is arbitrary and we experiment with alternative values as a sensitivity check.  For 
values of α close to one, more weight is placed on the contemporaneous observation of monthly 
income (indeed, α=1 is identical to our base case – the smoothed series would be equal to the 
observed series).  When α is close to zero, less weight is placed on the contemporaneous 
observed value of income and more on the observed values for previous months. 
 We computed the CVs of the smoothed data series for values of α = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 and found 
that each of these smoothing routines virtually eliminates the seam bias observed in the data.  
The levels of CVs calculated on smoothed income data are, of course, uniformly lower than 
those calculated from unadjusted data.  However, the pattern of results is consistent with the 
pattern reported in Table 1 – income volatility has risen over time for all households, with larger 
increases for low-income households, and income volatility is considerably higher for lower-
income than for higher-income households.
14  
 
4.  Discussion 
 
We find that monthly income volatility is considerably greater for lower-income than for higher-
income U.S. households and that there was a substantial increase in income volatility for 
households in deep poverty and those at risk for welfare recipiency.  This result holds even in the 
face of checks for robustness.  We also find a smaller increase in volatility for all households, 
however this result is sensitive to the degree to which imputed data is included in the analysis.  
In order to examine the sources of increased income volatility for these households, we 
decompose pre-tax cash income into three components:  earned income, AFDC/TANF income 
and all other income.  Our analysis suggests that the large rise in volatility among the poorest 
                                                 
13 The smoothed series begins with month 2 and the starting value is estimated as S2 = α Y2 + (1-α) Ybar, where 
Ybar is the mean of the observed household income series.  We experimented with an alternate specification for the 
starting value (S2 = α Y2 + (1-α) Y1) and found similar results.   
14Using the 1996 SIPP and applying exponential smoothing techniques, Newman (2006) also finds very similar 
results regarding differences in monthly income volatility by household income level. 8 
households and among welfare at-risk households is primarily a result of a shift in the 
composition of income from welfare payments to earnings and other income sources.  
  
These findings suggest that the nexus of income level, income volatility, and access to a social 
safety net may be more important to the well-being of lower-income households than previously 
recognized in this and related literatures.  Various aspects of these relationships deserve 
continued attention.  In particular, the rise in volatility for households living with very low 
incomes suggests that these households are now more likely to experience repeated bouts of 
economic deprivation due to either more frequent or more extreme negative income shocks.  
While theory might suggest that households with perfect information and access to capital 
markets should engage in saving, dissaving and borrowing in order to smooth consumption over 
time, there are reasons that this is not always the case.  Mean household income may be too low 
to allow for savings, households may have time inconsistent intertemporal preferences with 
regard to current consumption and future savings, or they may be liquidity constrained or only 
have access to high-priced loans (e.g. payday or car title loans).  Furthermore, eligibility for 
many types of assistance is based on strict limits on asset accumulation; program participation 
itself may discourage the kind of household saving behavior needed to weather negative income 
shocks.  Thus, increased volatility may lead to increased episodic material deprivation.   9 
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All Households 18.7 29.5 18.3 20.8 38.6 20.3
By HH inc as pct of poverty level
below 50 percent 36.0 67.7
between 50 and 100 percent 28.0 32.0
between 100 and 150 percent  24.5 27.5
over 150 percent 18.0 20.1
Welfare 'at-risk' population (single 
parents, no HS diploma, no other adults 
in household) 22.6 36.6
Not welfare 'at-risk'  18.7 20.8
Did not complete HS 21.6 27.4 20.7 24.4 29.7 23.7
HS graduate 18.4 32.7 18.1 20.5 42.6 20.1
TANF/AFDC 24.7 21.1 28.7 35.3 37.4 30.2
No TANF/AFDC 18.6 34.2 18.2 20.7 38.8 20.3
Food Stamp Recipiency 26.3 23.0 29.2 32.0 34.0 31.6
No Food Stamp Recipiency 18.4 41.8 18.1 20.5 43.9 20.1
Disable person in HH 20.1 25.5 19.7 21.3 21.1 21.3
No disabled person in house 18.4 33.3 18.0 20.8 47.3 20.2
Homeowners 17.2 36.4 16.9 19.3 39.6 19.1
Renters 22.0 27.5 21.5 25.0 38.3 23.9
Household Composition
Wife and husband with child(ren) 17.5 32.3 17.2 19.5 39.2 19.0
Single persons with child(ren) 22.4 23.8 22.0 26.8 41.5 24.0
No children 19.0 37.6 18.7 20.8 36.1 20.6
Race/Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 18.7 31.5 18.3 20.4 39.4 20.1
Non-Hispanic black 18.6 26.1 18.0 23.2 31.3 22.4
Hispanic 24.3 34.2 23.6 29.5 49.6 26.4
Non-Hispanic other 20.0 27.4 19.4 21.1 69.0 20.5
Household Size
1 person 20.6 36.4 20.2 21.8 29.1 21.5
2 persons 19.2 31.5 19.0 20.7 44.2 20.3
3 persons 18.1 29.7 17.7 20.9 48.5 20.3
4 persons 17.7 28.4 17.3 20.1 43.3 19.5
5 persons 18.7 28.7 17.9 20.1 33.2 19.7
6 persons 18.9 29.1 17.8 22.2 37.1 20.6
7 or more persons 19.4 23.5 18.9 23.9 34.0 23.2
N 22,776             1,887               20,889             18,497             1,789               16,708            
a Measured as the median coefficient of variation (multiplied by 100) of total household income over 12 months.  See text for details.
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Panel A: Mean Coefficient of Variation (x100) over 12 months:
Total Income 26.8 30.8 29.9 52.8 26.7 30.4 52.3 77.9 36.0 44.1 32.4 36.2 24.8 27.5
Earnings 32.7 34.3 50.9 64.0 32.4 33.9 58.0 70.5 59.5 56.5 46.3 43.1 28.8 30.6
AFDC/TANF 4.2 2.3 22.7 24.2 3.9 2.0 14.2 13.3 16.5 9.6 9.7 5.2 2.6 1.1
Other Income 67.0 54.7 61.4 55.7 67.1 54.7 73.1 43.6 37.8 42.4 64.1 47.1 69.1 56.6
Panel B: Mean Percent of Total Annual Income from:
Earnings 84% 87% 37% 58% 84% 88% 23% 45% 47% 57% 71% 76% 89% 92%
AFDC/TANF 3% 1% 40% 14% 2% 0% 36% 12% 17% 3% 3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.1%
Other Income 14% 12% 23% 28% 14% 12% 41% 43% 36% 40% 26% 23% 10% 8%
Panel C: Shorrocks Decomposition - Percent of Income Volatility from:
Earnings 88% 90% 55% 68% 88% 90% 37% 54% 62% 65% 85% 83% 91% 94%
AFDC/TANF 2% 1% 76% 7% 1% 1% 57% 21% 4% 1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0%
Other Income 10% 9% -31% 25% 11% 9% 6% 25% 34% 34% 14% 17% 9% 6%
N 22,776       18,497     371          263       22,405     18,234       612          633       1,275       1,156    1,567      1,335    19,322       15,373    
All Households
Table 2.  Components of Income Volatility, by Income Level and Household Type
Household Income Relative to Poverty Line: Welfare 'At-
Risk'
Not Welfare 'At-
Risk' < 50% 50-100% 100-150% 150+
 